Attack Detection in Sensor Network Target Localization Systems with
  Quantized Data by Zhang, Jiangfan et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
70
5.
05
42
4v
1 
 [c
s.I
T]
  1
5 M
ay
 20
17
1
Attack Detection in Sensor Network Target
Localization Systems with Quantized Data
Jiangfan Zhang, Member, IEEE, Xiaodong Wang, Fellow, IEEE, Rick S. Blum, Fellow, IEEE,
and Lance M. Kaplan, Fellow, IEEE
Abstract
We consider a sensor network focused on target localization, where sensors measure the signal
strength emitted from the target. Each measurement is quantized to one bit and sent to the fusion center.
A general attack is considered at some sensors that attempts to cause the fusion center to produce an
inaccurate estimation of the target location with a large mean-square-error. The attack is a combination of
man-in-the-middle, hacking, and spoofing attacks that can effectively change both signals going into and
coming out of the sensor nodes in a realistic manner. We show that the essential effect of attacks is to alter
the estimated distance between the target and each attacked sensor to a different extent, giving rise to a
geometric inconsistency among the attacked and unattacked sensors. Hence, with the help of two secure
sensors, a class of detectors are proposed to detect the attacked sensors by scrutinizing the existence
of the geometric inconsistency. We show that the false alarm and miss probabilities of the proposed
detectors decrease exponentially as the number of measurement samples increases, which implies that
for sufficiently large number of samples, the proposed detectors can identify the attacked and unattacked
sensors with any required accuracy.
Index Terms
Target localization, attack detection, spoofing attack, man-in-the-middle attack, malfunction, sensor
network, large deviations theory.
I. INTRODUCTION
Sensor networks find wide applications ranging from inexpensive commercial systems to complex
military and homeland defense surveillance systems and have seen ever growing interest in recent years
[1]. One important application of sensor networks is to estimate the location of a target in a region
of interest (ROI) [2]–[4]. Recent technological advances in digital wireless communications and digital
2electronics have led to the dominance of digital transmission and processing using quantized data in such
systems. Hence, a great deal of attention has focused on target localization in sensor networks using
quantized data, see [5]–[7] for instance.
Typically, large-scale sensor networks are comprised of low-cost and spatially distributed sensor nodes
with limited battery capacity and low computing power, which makes the system vulnerable to cyberat-
tacks by adversaries. This has led to a vast interest in studying the vulnerability of sensor networks in
various applications and from different perspectives, see [8]–[15] and the references therein. Depending
on the place where the attack is launched, there are generally three categories of attacks in sensor
networks, namely spoofing attacks, hacking attacks, and man-in-the-middle attacks (MiMA). To be
specific, the spoofing attack changes the phenomenon observed by the attacked sensors and tampers with
the observations coming into the sensors. For example, data-injection attack is one type of spoofing attack
[10]. The hacking attack aims at hacking into the sensors, modifying the hardware, and/or reprogramming
the devices, with the goal of disrupting the data processing in the attacked senors. Note that malfunctions
of sensors can also be considered as hacking attacks. The MiMA takes place between the sensors and
a fusion center (FC), which maliciously falsifies the data transmitted from the attacked sensors to the
FC, see [7], [11], [12] for instance. The main goal of the adversaries is to undermine the sensor network
and render the FC to reach an inaccurate estimate of the target location in terms of large mean-square
estimation error. A simple and intuitive method to combat the attacks is to identify the attacked sensors
so that the FC can either discard data from these sensors, or make use of attacked data to improve its
estimate of the target location via jointly estimating the target location and the attacks [11], [12], [15].
A. Summary of Results and Main Contributions
In this paper, we consider a sensor network containing two widely separated secure sensors which
have a very high level of security and thereby are guaranteed to be tamper-proof. The rest of sensors
are unsecure, which are subject to arbitrary forms of attacks. In practice, the two secure sensors can be
well protected, built with powerful chips, and supplied with sufficient power, thereby highly sophisticated
encryption algorithms and security procedures can be implemented.
This paper aims at developing a general detection approach which does not rely on the form of the
attacks or attack parameters, to identify the attacked sensors in the sensor network with provable detection
performance guarantee. It is worth mentioning that the problem of attack detection in target localization
systems is difficult, since the statistical model of sensor data depend on the target location and the attack
strategy which are both unknown to the FC. By exploring the impact of the attacks on the statistical
3model of the sensor data, we reveal that the essential effect of attacks is to alter the estimated distance
between the target and each attacked sensor to a different extent, giving rise to a geometric inconsistency
among the attacked and unattacked sensors. Motivated by this fact, a class of detectors are proposed to
detect the attacked sensors via scrutinizing the existence of the geometric inconsistency. To be specific,
a naive maximum likelihood estimator (NMLE), the MLE formulated under the assumption of no attack,
is first employed to estimate the distance between the target and each sensor. For each unsecure sensor,
a circle is generated which is centered at the sensor with radius equal to the NMLE of its distance to
the target. For each of the two secure sensors, a ring with some constant width is generated. This ring is
centered at the sensor and is bisected by a circle with radius equal to the NMLE of the distance from the
sensor to the target. If the circle of an unsecure sensor passes through the common area of the two rings,
the sensor is declared unattacked; otherwise, we declare that it is under attack. A thorough performance
analysis is carried out for the proposed detectors, showing that the false alarm and miss probabilities
decrease exponentially as the number of data samples at each sensor grows, which implies that if for a
sufficiently large number of samples, the proposed detectors can identify the attacked sensors with an
arbitrary level of accuracy.
B. Related Works
With the proliferation of sensor network applications, there is an increasing concern about the security
of sensor networks, see [8], [9], [16]–[19] for instance. Most existing works on the security in sensor
network target localization systems only consider analog measurements. However, for a typical sensor
network with limited resources, it is desirable that only quantized data is transmitted from sensors to the
FC [5]–[7]. Moreover, there is a lack of theoretical performance analysis of attack detection strategies.
Attack detection in the context of target localization with quantized data has not been well investigated
in the literature. In [7], a specific attack model is considered and a practical approach is proposed to
detect attacks in target localization systems. In particular, several secure sensors are employed to provide a
coarse estimate of the target location, and then the expected behaviors of attacked and unattacked sensors
are calculated based on the coarse estimate and the attack model. This method is based on heuristic
and there is no detection performance guarantee. In our proposed approach, the estimate of the target
location is not required, and moreover, the attack detection performance is rigorously investigated, which
demonstrates that any identification accuracy can be achieved if the number of data samples is sufficiently
large. In addition, the approach in [7] requires the knowledge of the statistical model of the attack, which
is not required by our proposed approach.
4The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the system and adversary model.
In Section III, a class of detectors are proposed to identify the attacked sensors in the sensor network.
Section IV investigates the performance of the proposed detectors. In Section V, several numerical results
are provided to corroborate our theoretical analysis. Finally, Section VI provides our conclusions.
II. SYSTEM AND ADVERSARY MODELS
In this section, the system and general attack models are introduced. We also demonstrate how the
general attack model relates to some popular forms of attacks in practice.
A. System Model
Consider a sensor network consisting of N sensors and a FC to estimate the location of a target at
θT = [xT, yT], where xT and yT denote the coordinates of the target location on the two-dimensional
plane. For the j-th sensor, we use θj = [xj, yj ] to denote its location. Besides the N sensors, there also
exist two secure sensors in the sensor network which are labeled as the (N+1)-th and (N+2)-th sensors,
respectively. These two secure sensors are well protected and thereby are guaranteed to be tamper proof,
while the other N sensors are unsecure, which are subject to threat from adversaries. We assume that
the signal radiated from the target obeys an isotropic power attenuation model, and each sensor observes
K data samples. The k-th data sample at the j-th sensor is described as
sjk = P0
(
D0
Dj
)γ
+ njk, j = 1, 2, ..., N + 2, (1)
where the distance Dj between the j-th sensor and the target is defined by
Dj
∆
= ‖θj − θT‖ =
√
(xj − xT)2 + (yj − yT)2, j = 1, 2, ..., N + 2, (2)
the quantity P0 is the power measured at a reference distance D0, γ is the path-loss exponent, and njk
denotes the additive noise sample with probability density function (pdf) fj(njk).
We assume that P0, D0, γ, {fj(·)}N+2j=1 , and {θj}N+2j=1 are known to the FC. Moreover, we assume
{njk} are independent, and for each j, {njk}Kk=1 is an identically distributed sequence. In addition, we
assume that the target stays in a specified ROI A where no sensor exists. By defining
DL
∆
= min
j=1,2,...,N+2
inf
θ∈A
‖θj − θ‖ > 0, (3)
and DU
∆
= max
j=1,2,...,N+2
sup
θ∈A
‖θj − θ‖ <∞, (4)
5we know that for any j ∈ {1, 2, ..., N + 2},
Dj ∈ [DL,DU] . (5)
Regarding the secure sensors and the ROI A, we make the following assumption.
Assumption 1: The secure sensors are widely separated so that
DS , ‖θN+1 − θN+2‖ > DU −DL + 2Υ1 (6)
for some positive constant Υ1. In addition, the ROI A is contained in one of the two half spaces produced
by dividing the whole space by the line passing through the two secure sensors. By the triangle inequality
of sides, we assume
inf
θT∈A
{DN+1 +DN+2} > DS + 2Υ2 (7)
for some positive constant Υ2.
Due to the low-rate communication constraint between the sensors and the FC, each sensor j quantizes
its sample sjk to one bit and then transmits the bit to the FC. For simplicity, we assume that the sensors
employ the following threshold quantizers {Qj}N+2j=1
ujk = Qj (sjk) , 1 {sjk ∈ (τj,∞)} , j = 1, 2, ..., N + 2, k = 1, 2, ...,K, (8)
where τj is the threshold employed at the j-th sensor and we assume that the thresholds {τj}N+2j=1 are
known to the FC.
Using (1) and (8), define
pj(θT) , Pr (ujk = 0 |θT ) = Fj
(
τj − P0
(
D0
Dj
)γ)
, (9)
where Fj (x)
∆
=
∫ x
−∞ fj (t) dt. By employing (5) and (9), we can define
ρ
(L)
j , inf
θ∈A
pj(θ) = Fj
(
τj − P0
(
D0
DL
)γ)
, (10)
ρ
(U)
j , sup
θ∈A
pj(θ) = Fj
(
τj − P0
(
D0
DU
)γ)
, (11)
and hence,
pj(θT) ∈
[
ρ
(L)
j , ρ
(U)
j
]
, j = 1, 2, ..., N + 2. (12)
We assume that fj(x) is continuous, and F
−1
j (x) exists and is differentiable over the open interval
(0, 1) for each j. Noticing that
∂F−1j (x)
∂x
= [fj(F
−1
j (x))]
−1, the differentiability of F−1j (x) implies 0 <
fj(x) <∞ over {x|Fj(x) ∈ (0, 1)}, and therefore, Fj(x) is strictly increasing over {x|Fj(x) ∈ (0, 1)}.
6It is clear that if there exists some θ ∈ A such that
τj − P0
(
D0
‖θj − θ‖
)γ
/∈ supp (fj) , {x|fj(x) 6= 0} , (13)
then Fj(τj − P0( D0‖θj−θ‖ )γ) = 0 or 1, and hence, the quantized data from the j-th sensor is useless in
estimating θ. To this end, we assume that the quantizers are well designed, and thereby τj , DL and DU
satisfy
inf {supp (fj)} < τj − P0
(
D0
DU
)γ
< τj − P0
(
D0
DL
)γ
< sup {supp (fj)} , (14)
which yields
0 < Fj
(
τj − P0
(
D0
DL
)γ)
< Fj
(
τj − P0
(
D0
DU
)γ)
< Fj (τj) ≤ 1, j = 1, 2, ..., N + 2, (15)
since Fj(·) is strictly increasing, from (10) and (11), we know
0 < ρ
(L)
j < ρ
(U)
j < Fj (τj) ≤ 1. (16)
B. Adversary Model
We consider a general attack model which brings about a change in the statistical model of ujk. Let
U and V denote the set of unattacked and attacked sensors, respectively.
sjk ujk
~ujksjk
gj(·) ~Qj(·) hj(·)
Qj(·)
(a) Unattacked sensor model
(b) Attacked sensor model
Fig. 1: Unattacked and attacked sensor models.
In general, if j ∈ V , three types of possible attacks can affect the j-th sensor, which are illustrated
in Fig. 1 (b). First, the adversaries can tamper with the observations {sjk}Kk=1. Such attacks are called
spoofing attacks, which can be represented by a mapping gj(·). The second type of attack which we call
hacking, aims at modifying the sensor hardware and/or software, and thereby modifying the quantizer
Qj(·) to Q˜j(·) in the attacked sensors as shown in Fig. 1 (b). The last type of possible attack occurs
between the sensors and the FC, which is referred to as man-in-the-middle attacks (MiMA). The MiMA
7can be described by a mapping hj(·) that modifies the quantized data before it arrives at the FC. Therefore,
the post attack quantized data can be generally expressed as
u˜jk = hj
(
Q˜j (gj (sjk))
)
. (17)
With regard to the alphabet set of u˜jk, we make the following assumption.
Assumption 2: We assume that if j ∈ V , then the alphabet set of u˜jk is still {0, 1}. Otherwise, the
detection of attacks is trivial.
Define
p˜j(θT) , Pr (u˜jk = 0 |θT ) = pj(θT) + Ψj, j = 1, 2, ..., N, (18)
where the quantity Ψj represents the impact of the attacks on the statistical model of the data. Clearly, if
Ψj = 0, then we can ignore the corresponding attack, since it is ineffective from the perspective of the
FC. Hence, without loss of generality, if j ∈ V , then we assume Ψj 6= 0, while if j ∈ U , then Ψj = 0.
To illustrate (18) in a concrete way, we take the MiMA as an example. Under a class of MiMAs [7],
[11], [12], the quantized data ujk is flipped with probability ψj,i if ujk = i for i ∈ {0, 1}, i.e., if the j-th
sensor is attacked, 
Pr (u˜jk = 1 |ujk = 0) = ψj,0,
Pr (u˜jk = 0 |ujk = 1) = ψj,1,
(19)
where ψj,i ∈ [0, 1]. Using (19), we have
p˜j(θT) = (1− ψj,0 − ψj,1) pj(θT) + ψj,0, (20)
and Ψj = ψj,0 − (ψj,0 + ψj,1) pj(θT). (21)
Besides the man-in-the-middle attacks, the spoofing attacks can also be shown to agree with (18) [8],
[9], [15].
From a practical point of view, the following assumptions on the attacks are made throughout this
paper.
Assumption 3:
1) Subtle Attacks. By the strong law of large numbers, we know that as K →∞, 1
K
∑K
k=1 (1− u˜jk)→
p˜j(θT) almost surely. Thus, if p˜j(θT) /∈ [ρ(L)j , ρ(U)j ], then with sufficient observations, the attack
against the j-th sensor can be detected at the FC by checking whether 1
K
∑K
k=1 (1− u˜jk) is in the
range [ρ
(L)
j , ρ
(U)
j ]. For this reason, in order to reduce the possibility of being detected, the adversaries
should ensure
p˜j(θT) ∈
[
ρ
(L)
j , ρ
(U)
j
]
, j ∈ V. (22)
82) Significant Attacks. In order to bring about sufficient impact on the statistical characterization of the
bits from the attacked sensors, every adversary is required to guarantee a minimum distortion, i.e.,
|Ψj| > κ, j ∈ V, (23)
for some positive constant κ. Otherwise, the attacks can be ignored.
Our problem is to design an efficient strategy for the FC to identify the attacked sensors, based on the
binary observations it receives from all sensors, and to provide a performance analysis on the proposed
attack detection strategy.
III. ATTACK DETECTORS BASED ON NAIVE MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATOR
In this section, we first show that by employing a naive maximum likelihood estimator (NMLE), a
geometric inconsistency among each attacked sensor and other unattacked sensors can be utilized to
distinguish between the attacked and unattacked ones. Then, a class of detectors which are based on the
NMLE are proposed to detect the attacks in the sensor network.
A. Naive Maximum Likelihood Estimator and Geometric Inconsistency
For any j, from (9) and by employing the existence of F−1j (x), we can obtain
Dj = D0P
1
γ
0
[
τj − F−1j (pj(θT))
]− 1
γ
. (24)
Then the NMLE, which is the MLE under the assumption of no attack, of Dj is given by
D̂
(K)
j = D0P
1
γ
0
[
τj − F−1j
(
ξ
(K)
j
)]− 1
γ
, (25)
where ξ
(K)
j ,
1
K
K∑
k=1
(1− u˜jk) . (26)
Furthermore, define
D˜j , D0P
1
γ
0
[
τj − F−1j (p˜j (θT))
]− 1
γ
. (27)
It is seen from (27) that D˜j is a monotonic function of p˜j (θT), and since from (23), we know p˜j (θT) 6=
pj (θT), we have D˜j 6= Dj . What’s more, by the strong law of large numbers, we know
D̂
(K)
j →
 Dj, if j ∈ UD˜j, if j ∈ V almost surely, as K →∞. (28)
This implies that, from the perspective of the NMLE, if j ∈ V , the essential effect of the attack is a
falsification of the distance Dj between the target and the j-th sensor to some different D˜j . This gives
9θN+1 θN+2
θT
θj
DN+1 DN+2
Dj
Fig. 2: Geometric consistency among the j-th,
(N + 1)-th and (N + 2)-th sensors when j ∈ U .
θN+1 θN+2
θT
θj
DN+1 DN+2
Dj
g
Dj
Fig. 3: Geometric inconsistency among the j-th,
(N + 1)-th and (N + 2)-th sensors when j ∈ V .
rise to a geometric inconsistency between the j-th sensor and the two secure sensors, which is illustrated
in terms of the difference between Fig. 2 and Fig. 3. Specifically, if j ∈ U , as illustrated in Fig. 2, the
three circles centered at the j-th, (N+1)-th and (N+2)-th sensors and with radii Dj , DN+1 and DN+2,
respectively, intersect at the point θT; while if j ∈ V , then the three circles do not intersect at θT as
illustrated in Fig. 3.
Motivated by this fact, consider three circles centered at the j-th, (N+1)-th and (N+2)-th sensors and
with radii D̂
(K)
j , D̂
(K)
N+1 and D̂
(K)
N+2, respectively. If j ∈ V , then from (28), we know that with sufficiently
large K and Assumption 3, it is impossible for these three circles to intersect at a common point. This
observation forms the basis of the proposed attack detection strategy.
B. Attack Detection Strategy
In order to mathematically formulate the attack detector, we first define three geometric shapes.
According to Assumption 1, the ROI A is contained in one of the two half spaces produced by dividing
the whole space by the line passing through the two secure sensors. We use S to represent this half
space. Let C(θ0, R) denote the intersection of S and the circle centered at θ0 and with radius R, i.e.,
C(θ0, R) , {θ ∈ S |‖θ − θ0‖ = R} , (29)
which is illustrated by the blue curve in Fig. 4. Let R(θ0, R, δ) denote the intersection of S and the ring
centered at θ0, with radius R and width δ, i.e.,
R(θ0, R, δ) , {θ ∈ S |R− δ ≤ ‖θ − θ0‖ ≤ R+ δ } . (30)
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θN+1 θN+2
θ0
C(θ0; R)
S
R
Fig. 4: Geometric illustration of
C(θ0, R).
θN+1 θN+2
θ0
R(θ0; R; δ)
S
R
R
R + δ
δ
Fig. 5: Geometric illustration of
R(θ0, R, δ).
θN+1 θN+2
θ0
B(θ0; R)
S
Fig. 6: Geometric illustration of
B(θ0, R).
The region enclosed by the blue boundary in Fig. 5 depicts an example of R(θ0, R, δ). Let B(θ0, R)
denote the intersection of S and the ball centered at θ0 and with radius R, i.e.,
B(θ0, R) , {θ ∈ S |‖θ − θ0‖ ≤ R} . (31)
which is the blue region in Fig. 6.
It is worth mentioning that even though j ∈ U , due to the estimation error with finite K, the three
circles centered at the j-th, (N + 1)-th and (N + 2)-th sensors and with radii D̂
(K)
j , D̂
(K)
N+1 and D̂
(K)
N+2,
respectively, typically will not intersect at a common point. Thus, for finite K, checking the geometric
inconsistency among C(θj , D̂(K)j ), C(θN+1, D̂(K)N+1) and C(θN+2, D̂(K)N+2) cannot reliably tell whether the
j-th sensor is unattacked or not. To overcome this, we replace C(θN+1, D̂(K)N+1) and C(θN+2, D̂(K)N+2) with
R(θN+1, D̂(K)N+1, δ) and R(θN+2, D̂(K)N+2, δ) for some δ, respectively, and scrutinize whether C(θj , D̂(K)j )
pass through the common area of R(θN+1, D̂(K)N+1, δ) and R(θN+2, D̂(K)N+2, δ) instead.
To be specific, for the j-th sensor, j = 1, 2, ..., N , we consider the following hypothesis testing problem H0 : j ∈ UH1 : j ∈ V (32)
and a class of detectors
̟j (δ) =

0, if C
(
θj , D̂
(K)
j
)
∩
[
2∩
i=1
R
(
θN+i, D̂
(K)
N+i, δ
)]
6= ∅,
1, if C
(
θj , D̂
(K)
j
)
∩
[
2∩
i=1
R
(
θN+i, D̂
(K)
N+i, δ
)]
= ∅,
(33)
for some constant δ, where D̂
(K)
j is defined in (25).
The geometric illustration of the proposed detector in (33) is depicted in Fig. 7, where the region
enclosed by the red curves is the common area of R(θN+1, D̂(K)N+1, δ) and R(θN+2, D̂(K)N+2, δ) which
plays an important role in the attack detection process. It is worth noticing that the center of this common
area is determined by two random variables D̂
(K)
N+1 and D̂
(K)
N+2, and thereby is randomly located. To this
11
θN+1 θN+2
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(K)
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D
(K)
j
2δ2δ
C(θj;
d
D
(K)
j )
2
\
i=1
R
0
B@θN+i;
d
D
(K)
N+i; δ
1
CA
S
Fig. 7: Geometric illustration of the proposed detectors.
end, this common area may not cover the true target location θT. In addition, the size of the common
area of R(θN+1, D̂(K)N+1, δ) and R(θN+2, D̂(K)N+2, δ) depends on the parameter δ which impacts the false
alarm and miss probabilities of the proposed detector.
IV. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED DETECTOR
In this section, the detection performance of the proposed detector in (33) is investigated. We will
show that the false alarm and miss probabilities of the proposed detector decay exponentially fast as the
number of data samples at each sensor increases.
To start with, we provide the following lemma regarding the lower and upper bounds on the common
area of R(θN+1,DN+1, δ) and R(θN+2,DN+2, δ).
Lemma 1: If
δ < Υ , min{Υ1,Υ2}, (34)
then
sup
θ∈
2
∩
i=1
R(θN+i,D̂(K)N+i,δ)
‖θ − θT‖ < Φ(δ) , (2DU +Υ)
1
2
[
2DU +Υ
DS
(
Υ
DS
+ 1
)
+ 2
] 1
2 √
δ, (35)
which implies
B(θT, δ) ⊆
2∩
i=1
R
(
θN+i, D̂
(K)
N+i, δ
)
⊆ B (θT,Φ(δ)) . (36)
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Proof: Refer to Appendix A.
As demonstrated by Lemma 1, the common area of R(θN+1,DN+1, δ) and R(θN+2,DN+2, δ) can be
bounded by two balls from below and above. Moreover, the radii of these two balls are both increasing
functions of the given δ. It will be shown later that by employing the two balls to approximate the
irregular area ∩2i=1R(θN+i, D̂(K)N+i, δ) from below and above, the detection performance analysis of the
proposed detector in (33) can be considerably facilitated.
A. Upper Bound on False Alarm Probability
From (33), the false alarm and miss probabilities of the proposed detector are given by P0 (̟j (δ) = 1)
and P1 (̟j (δ) = 0), respectively, where Pi denotes the probability measure under hypothesis Hi.
Let Ei denote the event
Ei ∆=
{∣∣∣D̂(K)N+i −DN+i∣∣∣ < 12δ
}
, i = 1, 2, (37)
and ECi denotes the complement of the event Ei. The false alarm probability of the detector in (33) can
be expressed as
P0 (̟j (δ) = 1) = P0
(
C
(
θj , D̂
(K)
j
)
∩
[
2∩
i=1
R
(
θN+i, D̂
(K)
N+i, δ
)]
= ∅
)
= P0
({
C
(
θj, D̂
(K)
j
)
∩
[
2∩
i=1
R
(
θN+i, D̂
(K)
N+i, δ
)]
= ∅
}
∩ (E1 ∩ E2)
)
+P0
({
C
(
θj, D̂
(K)
j
)
∩
[
2∩
i=1
R
(
θN+i, D̂
(K)
N+i, δ
)]
= ∅
}
∩ (EC1 ∪ EC2 )) . (38)
Note that Ei implies that
R
(
θN+i,DN+i,
1
2
δ
)
⊆ R
(
θN+i, D̂
(K)
N+i, δ
)
, (39)
and hence, from (38), we can obtain
P0 (̟j (δ) = 1) ≤ P0
({
C
(
θj , D̂
(K)
j
)
∩
[
2∩
i=1
R
(
θN+i,DN+i,
1
2
δ
)]
= ∅
}
∩ (E1 ∩ E2)
)
+P0
({
C
(
θj , D̂
(K)
j
)
∩
[
2∩
i=1
R
(
θN+i, D̂
(K)
N+i, δ
)]
= ∅
}
∩ (EC1 ∪ EC2 ))
≤ P0
(
C
(
θj , D̂
(K)
j
)
∩
[
2∩
i=1
R
(
θN+i,DN+i,
1
2
δ
)]
= ∅
)
+P0
(EC1 ∪ EC2 ) (40)
≤ P0
(
C
(
θj , D̂
(K)
j
)
∩
[
2∩
i=1
R
(
θN+i,DN+i,
1
2
δ
)]
=∅
)
+P0
(EC1 )+P0 (EC2 ) , (41)
where (40) is due to the fact that P0(E ∩ F) ≤ P0(E) for any two events E and F . Moreover, from
Lemma 1, we know
B
(
θT,
1
2
δ
)
⊆ 2∩
i=1
R
(
θN+i,DN+i,
1
2
δ
)
, (42)
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Fig. 8: Geometric illustration of (44).
which yields
P0 (̟j (δ) = 1) ≤ P0
(
C
(
θj, D̂
(K)
j
)
∩ B
(
θT,
1
2
δ
)
= ∅
)
+P0
(EC1 )+P0 (EC2 ) . (43)
In addition, as illustrated in Fig. 8, if j ∈ U , we know θT ∈ C(θj ,Dj) which yields that under
hypothesis H0, {
C
(
θj, D̂
(K)
j
)
∩ B
(
θT,
1
2
δ
)
= ∅
}
⇔
{∣∣∣D̂(K)j −Dj∣∣∣ ≥ 12δ
}
, (44)
and therefore, by employing (37) and (43), the false alarm probability can be bounded from above as per
P0 (̟j (δ) = 1) ≤ P0
(∣∣∣D̂(K)j −Dj∣∣∣ ≥ 12δ
)
+P0
(EC1 )+P0 (EC2 )
= P0
(∣∣∣D̂(K)j −Dj∣∣∣ ≥ 12δ
)
+
2∑
i=1
P0
(∣∣∣D̂(K)N+i −DN+i∣∣∣ ≥ 12δ
)
. (45)
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B. Upper Bound on Miss Probability
On the other hand, the miss probability of the detector in (33) can be bounded from above as per
P1 (̟j (δ) = 0) = P1
(
C
(
θj , D̂
(K)
j
)
∩
[
2∩
i=1
R
(
θN+i, D̂
(K)
N+i, δ
)]
6= ∅
)
= P1
({
C
(
θj, D̂
(K)
j
)
∩
[
2∩
i=1
R
(
θN+i, D̂
(K)
N+i, δ
)]
6= ∅
}
∩ (E1 ∩ E2)
)
+P1
({
C
(
θj , D̂
(K)
j
)
∩
[
2∩
i=1
R
(
θN+i, D̂
(K)
N+i, δ
)]
6= ∅
}
∩ (EC1 ∪ EC2 ))
≤ P1
({
C
(
θj, D̂
(K)
j
)
∩
[
2∩
i=1
R
(
θN+i,DN+i,
3
2
δ
)]
6= ∅
}
∩ (E1 ∩ E2)
)
+P1
(EC1 ∪ EC2 ) (46)
≤ P1
(
C
(
θj , D̂
(K)
j
)
∩
[
2∩
i=1
R
(
θN+i,DN+i,
3
2
δ
)]
6= ∅
)
+P1
(EC1 )+P1 (EC2 )
≤ P1
(
C
(
θj , D̂
(K)
j
)
∩ B
(
θT,Φ
(
3
2
δ
))
6= ∅
)
+P1
(EC1 )+P1 (EC2 ) , (47)
where (46) is due to the fact that if E1 and E2 occur, then
R
(
θN+i, D̂
(K)
N+i, δ
)
⊆ R
(
θN+i,DN+i,
3
2
δ
)
, i = 1, 2, (48)
and (47) is because ∩2i=1R
(
θN+i,DN+i,
3
2δ
) ⊆ B (θT,Φ (32δ)) according to Lemma 1.
Since the first term in (47) is hard to deal with, we employ an upper bound on it which is provided
in the following lemma.
Lemma 2: Define
λj ,
κD0P
1
γ
0
[
τj − F−1j
(
ρ
(L)
j
)]− γ+1
γ
sup
x∈[F−1j (ρ
(L)
j ),F
−1
j (ρ
(U)
j )]
fj (x)
, (49)
and denote
λ = min
j=1,2,...,N
{λj} . (50)
If
0 < δ < min
Υ,
{
(2DU +Υ)
1
2
[
6DU + 3Υ
2DS
(
Υ
DS
+ 1
)
+ 3
] 1
2
+
1
2
Υ
1
2
}−2
λ2
, (51)
then
P1
(
C
(
θj, D̂
(K)
j
)
∩ B
(
θT,Φ
(
3
2
δ
))
6= ∅
)
≤ P1
(∣∣∣D̂(K)j − D˜j∣∣∣ ≥ 12δ
)
, (52)
where D˜j is defined in (27).
Proof: Refer to Appendix B.
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It is worth mentioning that since fj(x) is continuous and positive over {x|Fj(x) ∈ (0, 1)}, the
denominator sup
x∈[F−1j (ρ
(L)
j ),F
−1
j (ρ
(U)
j )]
fj (x) in (49) is positive and bounded. Moreover, according to (10),
we know that τj > F
−1
j (ρ
(L)
j ), since F
−1
j is strictly increasing. Therefore, 0 < λj < ∞, and hence,
0 < λ <∞.
By employing (47) and Lemma 2, we know if (51) holds, then an upper bound on the miss probability
of the detector in (33) can be expressed as
P1 (̟j (δ) = 0) ≤ P1
(∣∣∣D̂(K)j − D˜j∣∣∣ ≥ 12δ
)
+P1
(EC1 )+P1 (EC2 )
= P1
(∣∣∣D̂(K)j − D˜j∣∣∣ ≥ 12δ
)
+
2∑
i=1
P1
(∣∣∣D̂(K)N+i −DN+i∣∣∣ ≥ 12δ
)
. (53)
C. Exponential Decay of False Alarm and Miss Probabilities
It is seen from (45) and (53) that the upper bounds on the false alarm and miss probabilities have some
similarities. To be specific, since the (N+1)-th and (N+2)-th sensors are secure,P0
(∣∣∣D̂(K)N+i −DN+i∣∣∣ ≥ 12δ) =
P1
(∣∣∣D̂(K)N+i −DN+i∣∣∣ ≥ 12δ) for i = 1, 2. Thus, the second term in (45) is the same as the second term
in (53). Moreover, as K → ∞, D̂(K)j → Dj almost surely under hypothesis H0, while D̂(K)j → D˜j
almost surely under hypothesis H1, one can expect that the first term in (45) and the first term in (53)
behave in a very similar way as K increases, except for the change in D̂
(K)
j due to the attack. In the
following theorem, by employing (45) and (53), we show that the false alarm and miss probabilities of
the detector in (33) decay at least exponentially with respect to K.
Theorem 1: If (51) holds, then the false alarm and miss probabilities are upper bounded by
P0 (̟j (δ) = 1) ≤ 12e−η
(0)
j (δ)K , (54)
P1 (̟j (δ) = 0) ≤ 12e−η
(1)
j (δ)K , (55)
for some positive constants η
(0)
j (δ) and η
(1)
j (δ).
Proof: Before proceeding, we define a sequence of events Fj,K as
Fj,K ,
{
ξ
(K)
j ∈
[
ε
(L)
j , ε
(U)
j
]}
, (56)
where ξ
(K)
j is defined in (26). The constants ε
(L)
j and ε
(U)
j in (56) are defined as
ε
(L)
j
∆
= σ
(L)
j ρ
(L)
j and ε
(U)
j
∆
= σ
(U)
j ρ
(U)
j +
(
1− σ(U)j
)
Fj (τj) (57)
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for some numbers σ
(L)
j , σ
(U)
j ∈ (0, 1), where Fj (τj) ∆=
∫ τj
−∞ fj (t) dt, and ρ
(L)
j and ρ
(U)
j are defined in
(10) and (11), respectively. From (16) and (57), we know that
0 < ε
(L)
j < ρ
(L)
j < ρ
(U)
j < ε
(U)
j < Fj (τj) ≤ 1. (58)
Let’s first consider the upper bound on the false alarm probability as illustrated in (45). For any
j ∈ {1, 2, ..., N + 2},
P0
(∣∣∣D̂(K)j −Dj∣∣∣ ≥ 12δ
)
= P0
({∣∣∣D̂(K)j −Dj∣∣∣ ≥ 12δ
}
∩ Fj,K
)
+P0
({∣∣∣D̂(K)j −Dj∣∣∣ ≥ 12δ
}
∩ FCj,K
)
≤ P0
({∣∣∣D̂(K)j −Dj∣∣∣ ≥ 12δ
}
∩ Fj,K
)
+P0
(FCj,K) . (59)
Note that under hypothesis H0, if ξ(K)j ∈ [ε(L)j , ε(U)j ], then by employing (24), (25) and (58), we can
obtain ∣∣∣D̂(K)j −Dj∣∣∣ = D0P 1γ0 ∣∣∣∣[τj − F−1j (ξ(K)j )]− 1γ − [τj − F−1j (pj (θT))]− 1γ ∣∣∣∣
≤ D0P
1
γ
0 sup
x∈[ε(L)j ,ε
(U)
j ]
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∂
[
τj − F−1j (x)
]− 1
γ
∂x
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣ξ(K)j − pj (θT)∣∣∣ (60)
= D0P
1
γ
0 sup
x∈[ε(L)j ,ε
(U)
j ]
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
[
τj − F−1j (x)
]− γ+1
γ
fj
(
F−1j (x)
)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣ξ(K)j − pj (θT)∣∣∣
≤
D0P
1
γ
0
[
τj − F−1j
(
ε
(U)
j
)]− γ+1
γ
inf
x∈[F−1j (ε
(L)
j ),F
−1
j (ε
(U)
j )]
fj (x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ξj
∣∣∣ξ(K)j − pj (θT)∣∣∣ , (61)
where (60) is due to the fact that pj(θT) ∈ [ε(L)j , ε(U)j ] and ξ(K)j ∈ [ε(L)j , ε(U)j ]. Since fj(x) is continuous
and 0 < fj(x) <∞ over {x|Fj(x) ∈ (0, 1)}, we know
inf
x∈[F−1j (ε
(L)
j ),F
−1
j (ε
(U)
j )]
fj (x) = min
x∈[F−1j (ε
(L)
j ),F
−1
j (ε
(U)
j )]
fj (x) ∈ (0,∞), (62)
and moreover, from (58), we know
τj − F−1j
(
ε
(U)
j
)
> 0, (63)
since ε
(U)
j < Fj (τj). Therefore, it is clear that Ξj ∈ (0,∞).
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By employing (61), we can obtain
P0
({∣∣∣D(K)j −Dj∣∣∣ ≥ 12δ
}
∩ Fj,K
)
≤ P0
({
Ξj
∣∣∣ξ(K)j − pj (θT)∣∣∣ ≥ 12δ
}
∩ Fj,K
)
≤ P0
(
ξ
(K)
j − pj (θT) ≥
δ
2Ξj
)
+P0
(
ξ
(K)
j − pj (θT) ≤ −
δ
2Ξj
)
= P0
 K∑
k=1
(1− u˜jk − pj (θT))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Xjk
≥ δ
2Ξj
K
+P0
 K∑
k=1
(u˜jk + pj (θT)− 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Yjk
≥ δ
2Ξj
K
 . (64)
It is easy to see that under hypothesis H0, {Xjk}Kk=1 is a sequence of independent and identically
distributed random variables with distribution
qXj
∆
= P0 (Xjk = 1− pj (θT)) = pj (θT) (65)
q¯Xj
∆
= P0 (Xjk = −pj (θT)) = 1− pj (θT) . (66)
Since
δ
2Ξj
K > E0 {Xjk} = [1− pj (θT)] qXj − pj (θT) q¯Xj = 0, (67)
by employing the large deviations theory [20], we can obtain
P0
(
K∑
k=1
(1− u˜jk − pj (θT)) ≥ δ
2Ξj
K
)
≤ e−ηj,1(δ)K , (68)
where the rate function ηj,1 (δ) is defined as
ηj,1 (δ)
∆
= − lim
K→∞
1
K
lnP0
(
K∑
k=1
Xjk ≥ δ
2Ξj
K
)
=
δ
2Ξj
µ∗ − lnφXj (µ∗) , (69)
and φXj (µ)
∆
= E0
{
eµXjk
}
= pj (θT) e
µ(1−pj(θT)) + (1− pj (θT)) e−µpj(θT). (70)
Moreover, the quantity µ∗ in (69) is the solution of the equation
d
dµ
φXj (µ) =
δ
2Ξj
φXj (µ) . (71)
By employing (69)–(71), the rate function ηj,1 (δ) can be obtained as
ηj,1 (δ) = η
∗
j,1 (δ) ,
(
δ
2Ξj
+ pj (θT)
)
ln
(
δ
2Ξj
+ pj (θT)
)
(1− pj (θT))
pj (θT)
(
1− δ2Ξj − pj (θT)
) − ln 1− pj (θT)
1− δ2Ξj − pj (θT)
, (72)
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provided that
δ
2Ξj
≤ 1− pj (θT). (73)
It is seen from (65) and (66) that
K∑
k=1
(1− u˜jk − pj (θT)) ≤ (1− pj (θT))K, (74)
which implies that for the case where δ2Ξj > 1− pj (θT),
P0
(
K∑
k=1
(1− u˜jk − pj (θT)) ≥ δ
2Ξj
K
)
= 0. (75)
Therefore, the rate function ηj,1 (δ) can be written as
1
ηj,1 (δ) = η
∗
j,1 (δ) 1
{
δ
2Ξj
≤ 1− pj (θT)
}
+∞1
{
δ
2Ξj
> 1− pj (θT)
}
, (76)
where η∗j,1 (δ) is defined in (72).
Similarly, noting that under hypothesis H0, {Yjk}Kk=1 is a sequence of independent and identically
distributed random variables with distribution
qXj
∆
= P0 (Yjk = pj (θT)− 1) = pj (θT) (77)
q¯Xj
∆
= P0 (Yjk = pj (θT)) = 1− pj (θT) , (78)
we can obtain
P0
(
K∑
k=1
(u˜jk + pj (θT)− 1) ≥ δ
2Ξj
K
)
≤ e−ηj,2(δ)K , (79)
where the rate function ηj,2 (δ) is given by
ηj,2 (δ) = η
∗
j,2 (δ) 1
{
δ
2Ξj
≤ pj (θT)
}
+∞1
{
δ
2Ξj
> pj (θT)
}
(80)
with η∗j,2 (δ)
∆
= ln
1 + δ2Ξj − pj (θT)
1− pj (θT) −
(
pj (θT)− δ
2Ξj
)
ln
pj (θT)
(
1 + δ2Ξj − pj (θT)
)
(
pj (θT)− δ2Ξj
)
(1− pj (θT))
. (81)
As a result, from (64), (68) and (79), we can obtain
P0
({∣∣∣D(K)j −Dj∣∣∣ ≥ 12δ
}
∩ Fj,K
)
≤ e−ηj,1(δ)K + e−ηj,2(δ)K , (82)
where ηj,1 (δ) and ηj,2 (δ) are defined in (76) and (80), respectively.
1Regarding the second term of the right-hand side of (76), we define ∞ · 0 = 0.
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Now, we consider the second term in (59). From (12) and (58), we know
0 < ε
(L)
j < pj (θT) < ε
(U)
j < 1, (83)
and hence, by employing similar arguments, we can obtain
P0
(FCj,K) = P0 (ξ(K)j /∈ [ε(L)j , ε(U)j ])
= P0
(
ξ
(K)
j > ε
(U)
j
)
+P0
(
ξ
(K)
j < ε
(L)
j
)
≤ P0
(
K∑
k=1
1− u˜jk − pj (θT) ≥
(
ε
(U)
j − pj (θT)
)
K
)
+P0
(
K∑
k=1
u˜jk + pj (θT)− 1 ≥
(
pj (θT)− ε(L)j
)
K
)
≤ e−ηε(U)j K + e−ηε(L)j K , (84)
where the rate functions can be expressed as
η
ε
(U)
j
= ε
(U)
j ln
ε
(U)
j (1− pj (θT))
pj (θT)
(
1− ε(U)j
) − ln 1− pj (θT)
1− ε(U)j
, (85)
and η
ε
(L)
j
= ln
1− ε(L)j
1− pj (θT) − ε
(L)
j ln
pj (θT)
(
1− ε(L)j
)
ε
(L)
j (1− pj (θT))
. (86)
It is worth noticing that η
ε
(L)
j
and η
ε
(U)
j
do not depend on δ.
As a result, from (59), (82) and (84), we know that for any j ∈ {1, 2, ..., N+2}, P0(|D̂(K)j −Dj | ≥ 12δ)
can be bounded from above as per
P0
(∣∣∣D̂(K)j −Dj∣∣∣ ≥ 12δ
)
≤ e−ηj,1(δ)K + e−ηj,2(δ)K + e−ηε(L)j K + e−ηε(U)j K , (87)
which yields an upper bound on the false alarm probability of the detector in (33)
P0 (̟j (δ) = 1) ≤
∑
i=j,N+1,N+2
e−ηi,1(δ)K + e−ηi,2(δ)K + e
−η
ε
(U)
i
K
+ e
−η
ε
(L)
i
K
≤ 12e−η(0)j (δ)K , (88)
with η
(0)
j (δ)
∆
= min
i=j,N+1,N+2
{
ηi,1 (δ) , ηi,1 (δ) , ηε(L)i
, η
ε
(U)
i
}
. (89)
Next, we consider the upper bound on the miss detection probability as given in (53).
By employing (18) and following the steps for obtaining (76), (80), (85), (86) and (87), we can obtain
P1
(∣∣∣D(K)j − D˜j∣∣∣ ≥ 12δ
)
≤ e−η˜j,1(δ)K + e−η˜j,2(δ)K + e−η˜ε(L)j K + e−η˜ε(U)j K (90)
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where η˜j,1(δ), η˜j,2(δ), η˜ε(L)j
and η˜
ε
(U)
j
can be expressed as
η˜j,1 (δ) = η˜
∗
j,1 (δ) 1
{
δ
2Ξj
≤ 1− p˜j (θT)
}
+∞1
{
δ
2Ξj
> 1− p˜j (θT)
}
, (91)
η˜j,2 (δ) = η˜
∗
j,2 (δ)1
{
δ
2Ξj
≤ p˜j (θT)
}
+∞1
{
δ
2Ξj
> p˜j (θT)
}
, (92)
η˜
ε
(L)
j
= ln
1− ε(L)j
1− p˜j (θT) − ε
(L)
j ln
p˜j (θT)
(
1− ε(L)j
)
ε
(L)
j (1− p˜j (θT))
. (93)
η˜
ε
(U)
j
= ε
(U)
j ln
ε
(U)
j (1− p˜j (θT))
p˜j (θT)
(
1− ε(U)j
) − ln 1− p˜j (θT)
1− ε(U)j
, (94)
and η˜∗j,1 (δ) and η˜
∗
j,2 (δ) are defined as
η˜∗j,1 (δ) ,
(
δ
2Ξj
+ p˜j (θT)
)
ln
(
δ
2Ξj
+ p˜j (θT)
)
(1− p˜j (θT))
p˜j (θT)
(
1− δ2Ξj − p˜j (θT)
) − ln 1− p˜j (θT)
1− δ2Ξj − p˜j (θT)
, (95)
η˜∗j,2 (δ)
∆
= ln
1 + δ2Ξj − p˜j (θT)
1− p˜j (θT) −
(
p˜j (θT)− δ
2Ξj
)
ln
p˜j (θT)
(
1 + δ2Ξj − p˜j (θT)
)
(
p˜j (θT)− δ2Ξj
)
(1− p˜j (θT))
. (96)
Moreover, noticing that
P1
(∣∣∣D̂(K)N+i −DN+i∣∣∣ ≥ 12δ
)
= P0
(∣∣∣D̂(K)N+i −DN+i∣∣∣ ≥ 12δ
)
, i = 1, 2, (97)
by employing (53), (87) and (90), we can obtain
P1 (̟j (δ) = 0) ≤ e−η˜j,1(δ)K + e−η˜j,2(δ)K + e
−η˜
ε
(L)
j
K
+ e
−η˜
ε
(U)
j
K
+
N+2∑
i=N+1
e−ηi,1(δ)K + e−ηi,2(δ)K + e
−η
ε
(U)
i
K
+ e
−η
ε
(L)
i
K
≤ 12e−η(1)j (δ)K , (98)
where the quantity η
(1)
j (δ) is defined as
η
(1)
j (δ)
∆
= min
i=N+1,N+2
{
η˜j,1 (δ) , η˜j,2 (δ) , ηi,1 (δ) , η˜ε(L)j
, η˜
ε
(U)
j
, ηi,1 (δ) , ηε(L)i
, η
ε
(U)
i
}
. (99)
As demonstrated by Theorem 1, the false alarm and miss probabilities of the proposed detector in (33)
are guaranteed to decay exponentially as K increases. The decay rates are illustrated in (89) and (99)
which depend on the choice of δ. In general, a smaller δ leads to a larger false alarm probability and
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a smaller miss probability. Hence, the trade-off between the false alarm and miss probabilities can be
sought via altering the value of δ.
Using Theorem 1, the average detector error probability Pe can be bounded from above as per
Pe =
1
N
∑
j∈U
P0 (̟j = 1) +
1
N
∑
j∈V
P1 (̟j = 0)
≤ 12
N
∑
j∈U
e−η
(0)
j (δ)K +
12
N
∑
j∈V
e−η
(1)
j (δ)K
≤ Cee−ηe(δ)K , (100)
where the positive constants Ce and ηe(δ) are defined as
Ce = 12 and ηe (δ)
∆
= min
j=1,2,...,N
{
η
(0)
j (δ) , η
(1)
j (δ)
}
. (101)
This observation is summarized in the following corollary.
Corollary 1: If (51) holds, then the average detector error probability decreases at least exponentially
as K increases.
It is worth pointing out that the sufficient condition on δ in Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 are generally
not necessary, which is observed in all the numerical experiments that we carried out.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we first introduce how to implement the proposed attack detector in practice, and then
we test the performance of the proposed attack detector to corroborate the theoretical results in previous
sections.
A. Implementation of the Attack Detector
By employing (25), D̂
(K)
j , D̂
(K)
N+1 and D̂
(K)
N+2 can be computed, and thereby the analytical expression
of C(θj , D̂(K)j ) can be obtained. Note that every point θ in the common area of R = (θN+1, D̂(K)N+1, δ)
and R(θN+2, D̂(K)N+2, δ) satisfies the condition −δ ≤ ‖θ − θN+1‖ − D̂
(K)
N+1 ≤ δ,
−δ ≤ ‖θ − θN+2‖ − D̂(K)N+2 ≤ δ.
(102)
Therefore, to implement the attack detector in (33), we only need to check whether any point on the
circle C(θj , D̂(K)j ) satisfies the condition in (102) or not.
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One brute force way to do this is to discretize C(θj , D̂(K)j ) to finitely many points which are evenly
spaced along the circle, and then we check the condition in (102) for these points. In particular, we can
discretize C(θj , D̂(K)j ) to M points {θ(m)C }Mm=1 in the way that
θ
(m)
C =
[
xj + D̂
(K)
j cos
(
2π
M
(m− 1)
)
, yj + D̂
(K)
j sin
(
2π
M
(m− 1)
)]
, (103)
where xj and yj are the coordinates of the j-th sensor. We summarize this implementation in Algorithm
1. Intuitively, we expect that this approach may not work well for small M .
Algorithm 1 Implementation of attack detector
1: Input: {uik}Kk=1 for i = N + 1, N + 2, {u˜jk}Kk=1, and δ;
2: Output: ̟j(δ);
3: Compute D̂
(K)
j , D̂
(K)
N+1 and D̂
(K)
N+2 by employing (25);
4: Discretize C(θj , D̂(K)j ) to {θ(m)C }Mm=1 by employing (103);
5: m← 1 and ̟j(δ)← 1;
6: while m ≤M and ̟j(δ) = 1 do
7: if θ
(m)
C ∈ S and (102) holds then
8: ̟j(δ)← 0;
9: end if
10: m← m+ 1;
11: end while
B. Simulation Setup and Results
The simulation setup is illustrated in Fig. 9. Consider a sensor network consisting of two groups of
sensors with N = 500. The two secure sensors are located at θ501 = (−103, 0) and θ502 = (103, 0),
respectively. The rest of sensors are all located along the x-axis, and are partitioned into two groups.
The first group of sensors {1, 2, ..., 250, 501} are evenly spaced between (−103, 0) and (−0.9× 103, 0),
while the second group of sensors {251, 252, ..., 500, 502}are evenly spaced between (0.9 × 103, 0) and
(103, 0). The ROI A is a disc centered at (0, 105) and with radius equal to 7500. The target is located
at θT = (0, 10
5). In the simulation, P0 = 1, D0 = 10
5, and γ = 2. When employing Algorithm 1
to implement the attack detector, M is chosen to be 2 × 105. In addition, the threshold τj = 1 for
all j, and njk follows a Gaussian distribution with zero mean and unit variance. We assume that 250
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Fig. 9: Simulation setup.
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Fig. 10: Attack identification performance of the proposed detectors.
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Fig. 11: Average false alarm probabilities of the proposed detector under different attacks.
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Fig. 12: Average miss probabilities of the proposed detector under different attacks.
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Fig. 13: Attack identification performance of the proposed detector under different attacks.
sensors {1, 2, ..., 250} are under the MiMA as described in (19) with ψj,0 = 0 and ψj,1 = 0.0105 for
j = 1, 2, ..., 250. The average detector error probability over 900 Monte Carlo runs versus the number
K of data samples are depicted on a log scale in Fig. 10 for four detectors with δ = 260, 280, 300, 320,
respectively. It is seen from Fig. 10 that for each detector, the average detector error probability decreases
exponentially as K grows which agrees with the theoretical results in the previous section. Moreover, as
illustrated in Fig. 10, the larger the value of δ, the better the identification performance, which implies
that in this simulation, as δ increases, the gain obtained in the false alarm probability is larger than the
loss in the miss probability, since the number of attacked sensors is the same as the number of unattacked
sensors.
Now, we consider the attack identification performance of the proposed detector under different attacks.
In Fig. 11, Fig. 12 and Fig. 13, the simulation setup is the same as that for Fig. 10, except δ = 280.
The different attacks are all MiMA and for j = 1, 2, ..., 250, [ψj,0, ψj,1] = [0, 0.0085], [0, 0.0095], and
[0, 0.0105], respectively. It is seen from Fig. 11 that under different attacks, the false alarm probabilities
achieved by the detector are very close, which agrees with the fact that the false alarm probability does
not depend on the attacks, but is only determined by δ. As expected from the intuition that the attack
which brings about a larger impact on the statistical model of the data should be easier to be detected,
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Fig. 12 demonstrates that the larger the value of ψj,1, the smaller the average miss probability. Fig. 13
also corroborates the intuition that the larger the attack impact on the statistical model of the data, the
better the attack identification performance that can be achieved.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This work has investigated the attack detection in sensor network target localization systems with
quantized data. By exploring the impact of the attacks on the statistical model of the sensor data, we
have revealed that from the perspective of the NMLE, the essential effect of attacks is a falsification of
the estimated distance between the target and each attacked sensor, and hence, gives rise to a geometric
inconsistency among the attacked and unattacked sensors. Motivated by this fact, a class of detectors
are proposed to detect the attacks in the sensor network via scrutinizing the existence of the geometric
inconsistency. A rigorous detection performance analysis for the proposed detectors has been carried out,
showing that the false alarm and miss probabilities decay exponentially as the number of data samples at
each sensor grows, which implies that for a sufficiently large number of samples, the proposed detectors
can identify the attacked sensors with any required level of accuracy.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Consider RN+1 and RN+2 which satisfy
|Ri −Di| ≤ δ < Υ, for i = N + 1, N + 2, (104)
and denote
θ
′
T , C(θN+1, RN+1) ∩ C(θN+2, RN+2). (105)
From (7) and (104), we know that
RN+1 +RN+2 ≥ DN+1 +DN+2 − 2δ > inf
θT∈A
{DN+1 +DN+2} − 2Υ2 = DS, (106)
and moreover, by employing (6) and (104), we can obtain
|RN+1 −RN+2| < |DN+1 −DN+2|+ 2δ < DU −DL + 2Υ ≤ DU −DL + 2Υ1 < DS. (107)
Thus, RN+1, RN+2 and DS can be the sides of a triangle, and hence, θ
′
T exists and cannot be on the line
passing through θN+1 and θN+2, which implies that the angle β , ∠θ
′
TθN+1θN+2 in Fig. 14 satisfies
β ∈ (0, π).
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Fig. 14: Geometric illustration.
Let α denote the angle ∠θTθN+1θN+2 as illustrated in Fig. 14. By the law of cosines, we can obtain
d(RN+1, RN+2) , ‖θ′T − θT‖ = R2N+1 +D2N+1 − 2RN+1DN+1 cos(β − α). (108)
According to Assumption 1, we know
DS > |DN+1 −DN+2| and DN+1 +DN+2 > DS, (109)
which yields α ∈ (0, π), and hence,
β − α ∈ (−π, π). (110)
From (108), we know that for any given RN+1, d(RN+1, RN+2) is maximized when cos(β − α) is
minimized. Since α is fixed and β−α ∈ (−π, π), cos(β−α) is minimized when β is either maximized or
minimized, which implies that d(RN+1, RN+2) is maximized when β is either maximized or minimized.
Furthermore, by the law of cosines, we can obtain
cos(β) =
R2N+1 +D
2
S −R2N+2
2RN+1DS
. (111)
Since β ∈ (0, π) and cos(β) is decreasing over β ∈ (0, π), for any givenRN+1, β is maximized if RN+2 is
maximized, while β is minimized if RN+2 is minimized. Therefore, for any given RN+1, d(RN+1, RN+2)
is maximized only when RN+2 = DN+2 + δ or RN+2 = DN+2 − δ, since |RN+2 −DN+2| ≤ δ.
Similarly, for any given RN+2, d(RN+1, RN+2) is maximized only when RN+1 = DN+1 + δ or
RN+1 = DN+1 − δ.
Thus, for any given RN+1 and RN+2 satisfying (104), the maximal d(RN+1, RN+2) can only be
achieved when RN+1 ∈ {DN+1 − δ,DN+1 + δ} and RN+2 ∈ {DN+2 − δ,DN+2 + δ}. To this end, in
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order to prove ∩2i=1R
(
θN+i, D̂
(K)
N+i, δ
)
⊆ B(θT,Φ(δ)), we only need to consider
RN+1 ∈ {DN+1 − δ,DN+1 + δ}, (112)
RN+2 ∈ {DN+2 − δ,DN+2 + δ}, (113)
and show θ′T ∈ B(θT,Φ(δ)).
Without loss of generality, we assume that θN+1 = 0, θN+2 = (DS, 0), and θT is in the half space
above the line passing through θN+1 and θN+2. Since θT , C(θN+1,DN+1)∩C(θN+2,DN+2), we can
obtain  x2T + y2T = D2N+1,(xT −DS)2 + y2T = D2N+2, (114)
which yields 
xT =
D2N+1−D
2
N+2+D
2
S
2DS
,
yT =
√
D2N+1 −
(
D2N+1−D
2
N+2+D
2
S
2DS
)2
.
(115)
Similarly, with regard to θ′T = (x
′
T, y
′
T) = C(θN+1, RN+1) ∩ C(θN+2, RN+2), we also can obtain
x′T =
R2N+1−R
2
N+2+D
2
S
2DS
,
y′T =
√
R2N+1 −
(
R2N+1−R
2
N+2+D
2
S
2DS
)2
.
(116)
By employing (115) and (116), d(RN+1, RN+2)
2 can be expressed as
d(RN+1, RN+2)
2
=
(
R2N+1 −R2N+2 +D2S
2DS
− D
2
N+1 −D2N+2 +D2S
2DS
)2
︸ ︷︷ ︸
dx
+

√√√√R2N+1 −
(
R2N+1 −R2N+2 +D2S
2DS
)2
−
√√√√D2N+1 −
(
D2N+1 −D2N+2 +D2S
2DS
)2
2
︸ ︷︷ ︸
dy
. (117)
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From (112) and (113), dx can be bounded from above as per
dx =
(
R2N+1 −D2N+1 +D2N+2 −R2N+2
2DS
)2
=
(
(RN+1 −DN+1) (RN+1 +DN+1) + (DN+2 −RN+2) (DN+2 +RN+2)
2DS
)2
≤ 1
D2S
δ2(DN+1 +DN+2 + δ)
2
≤ 1
D2S
(2DU + δ)
2δ2 (118)
and moreover, by using the fact that
√|x|−√|y| ≤√|x− y| for any x and y, dy can be bounded from
above as per
dy ≤
∣∣∣∣∣∣R2N+1 −
(
R2N+1 −R2N+2 +D2S
2DS
)2
−D2N+1 +
(
D2N+1 −D2N+2 +D2S
2DS
)2∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤ |(RN+1 −DN+1) (RN+1 +DN+1)|
+
∣∣∣∣∣
(
R2N+1 −R2N+2 −D2N+1 +D2N+2
) (
R2N+1 −R2N+2 +D2N+1 −D2N+2 + 2D2S
)
4D2S
∣∣∣∣∣ . (119)
By employing (112), (113) and (119), we can obtain
dy ≤ δ (2DN+1 + r) +
∣∣R2N+1 −D2N+1∣∣+ ∣∣R2N+2 −D2N+2∣∣
4D2S
× (∣∣R2N+1 −D2N+2∣∣+ ∣∣R2N+2 −D2N+1∣∣+ 2D2S)
≤ δ (2DN+1 + δ) + δ (2DN+1 + δ) + δ (2DN+2 + δ)
4D2S
× (|(RN+1 −DN+2) (RN+1 +DN+2)|+ |(RN+2 −DN+1) (RN+2 +DN+1)|+ 2D2S)
≤ δ (2DN+1 + δ) + δ (DN+1 +DN+2 + δ)
D2S
× [(|DN+1 −DN+2|+ δ) (DN+1 +DN+2 + δ) +D2S] (120)
≤ δ (2DN+1 + δ) + δ (2DU + δ)
[
(DU −DL + δ) (DN+1 +DN+2 + δ)
D2S
+ 1
]
≤ δ (2DU + δ) + δ (2DU + δ)
(
2DU + δ
DS
+ 1
)
(121)
≤ (2DU + δ)
(
2DU + δ
DS
+ 2
)
δ, (122)
where (120) is from (104), and (121) is due toDN+1 ≤ DU and Assumption 1 thatDS > DU−DL+2Υ >
DU −DL + δ, since δ < Υ.
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From (117), (118) and (122), we can obtain
d(RN+1, RN+2)
2 ≤ 1
D2S
(2DU + δ)
2δ2 + (2DU + δ)
(
2DU + δ
DS
+ 2
)
δ
≤ (2DU + δ)
[
2DU + δ
DS
(
δ
DS
+ 1
)
+ 2
]
δ
< (2DU +Υ)
[
2DU +Υ
DS
(
Υ
DS
+ 1
)
+ 2
]
δ, (123)
which implies
d(RN+1, RN+2) < (2DU +Υ)
1
2
[
2DU +Υ
DS
(
Υ
DS
+ 1
)
+ 2
] 1
2 √
δ, (124)
and therefore,
θ
′
T ∈ B(θT,Φ(δ)). (125)
Moreover, note that B(θT, δ) ⊂ R(θN+1,DN+1, δ) and B(θT, δ) ⊂ R(θN+2,DN+2, δ), and hence
B(θT, δ) ⊆ ∩2i=1R
(
θN+i, D̂
(K)
N+i, δ
)
. This completes the proof.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
By employing (35) and (51), we can obtain
Φ
(
3
2
δ
)
+
1
2
δ = (2DU +Υ)
1
2
[
2DU +Υ
DS
(
Υ
DS
+ 1
)
+ 2
] 1
2
√
3
2
δ +
1
2
δ
<
{
(2DU +Υ)
1
2
[
6DU + 3Υ
2DS
(
Υ
DS
+ 1
)
+ 3
] 1
2
+
1
2
Υ
1
2
}√
δ
< λ, (126)
and hence, Φ(32δ) < λ.
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Fig. 15: Geometric illustration of (132).
Furthermore, from (27), (49) and (50), we can obtain that∣∣∣D˜j −Dj∣∣∣ = D0P 1γ0 ∣∣∣∣[τj − F−1j (p˜j (θT))]− 1γ − [τj − F−1j (pj (θT))]− 1γ ∣∣∣∣
≥ D0P
1
γ
0 inf
x∈[ρ(L)j ,ρ
(U)
j ]
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∂
[
τj − F−1j (x)
]− 1
γ
∂x
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ |p˜j (θT)− pj (θT)| (127)
= D0P
1
γ
0 inf
x∈[ρ(L)j ,ρ
(U)
j ]
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
[
τj − F−1j (x)
]− γ+1
γ
fj
(
F−1j (x)
)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ |p˜j (θT)− pj (θT)|
≥
κD0P
1
γ
0
[
τj − F−1j
(
ρ
(L)
j
)]− γ+1
γ
sup
x∈[F−1j (ρ
(L)
j ),F
−1
j (ρ
(U)
j )]
fj (x)
(128)
> λ, (129)
where (127) is due to (12) and (22), and (128) is from (23). Thus, we know
C
(
θj , D˜j
)
∩ B
(
θT,Φ
(
3
2
δ
))
= ∅, (130)
since θT ∈ C (θj,Dj) and Φ(32δ) < λ.
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As illustrated in Fig. 15, if
C
(
θj, D̂
(K)
j
)
∩ B
(
θT,Φ
(
3
2
δ
))
6= ∅, (131)
then ∣∣∣D̂(K)j − D˜j∣∣∣ ≥ ∣∣∣D˜j −Dj∣∣∣− Φ(32δ
)
, (132)
which implies ∣∣∣D̂(K)j − D˜j∣∣∣ ≥ λ− Φ(32δ
)
>
1
2
δ, (133)
by employing (126) and (129). Therefore,
P1
(
C
(
θj, D̂
(K)
j
)
∩ B
(
θT,Φ
(
3
2
δ
))
6= ∅
)
≤ P1
(∣∣∣D̂(K)j − D˜j∣∣∣ ≥ 12δ
)
, (134)
which completes the proof.
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